-maintains policy of nuclear ambiguity
-wont sign the NPT because “contradictory to national security interests”, but support the idea of a nuclear free middle east (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction)
– started nuclear program with help from france in 1948, alleged to have started developing weapons in the 1960s
– originally concerned because didnt want holocaust reoccuring
– “In a 2010 interview, Uzi Eilam, former head of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, told the Israeli daily Maariv that the nuclear reactor in Dimona had been through extensive improvements and renovations and is now functioning as new, with no safety problems or hazard to the surrounding environment or the region”
-“Although Israel has officially acknowledged the existence of Dimona since Ben-Gurion’s speech to the Knesset in December 1960, Israel has never officially acknowledged its construction or possession of nuclear weapons. In addition to this policy, on May 18, 1966, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol told the Knesset that “Israel has no atomic weapons and will not be the first to introduce them into our region,” a policy first articulated by Shimon Peres to U.S. President John F. Kennedy in April 1963. In the late 1960s, Israeli Ambassador to the US Yitzhak Rabin informed the United States State Department that its understanding of “introducing” such weapons meant that they would be tested and publicly declared, while merely possessing the weapons did not constitute “introducing” them. Avner Cohen defines this initial posture as “nuclear ambiguity”, but he defines the stage after it became clear by 1970 that Israel possessed nuclear weapons as a policy of amimut, or “nuclear opacity”
– war strategy for israel includes maintaining preemption, and maybe using preemption
– Israel first articulated an official policy on the use of nuclear weapons in 1966, which revolved around four “red lines” that could lead to a nuclear response:
- A successful military penetration into populated areas within Israel’s post-1949 (pre-1967) borders.
- The destruction of the Israeli Air Force.
- The exposure of Israeli cities to massive and devastating air attacks or to possible chemical or biological attacks.
- The use of nuclear weapons against Israeli territory
Maintaining nuclear superiority/past use:
On September 6, 2007, Israel launched an air strike dubbed Operation Orchard against a target in the Deir ez-Zor region of Syria. While Israel refused to comment, unnamed US officials said Israel had shared intelligence with them that North Korea was cooperating with Syria on some sort of nuclear facility. Both Syria and North Korea denied the allegation and Syria filed a formal complaint with the United Nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency concluded in May 2011 that the destroyed facility was “very likely” an undeclared nuclear reactor.
Journalist Seymour Hersh speculated that this air strike might have been intended as a trial run for striking alleged Iranian nuclear weapons facilities. On January 7, 2007, The Sunday Times reported that Israel had drawn up plans to destroy three Iranian nuclear facilities with low-yield nuclear bunker-busters that would be launched by aircraft through “tunnels” created by conventional laser-guided bombs. These tactical nuclear weapons would then explode underground to reduce radioactive fallout. Israel swiftly denied the specific allegation and analysts expressed doubts about its reliability. However, in 2004 its then Defense minister said that it rules out no option. The death of the Iranian physicist Ardeshir Hassanpour, who may have been involved in the nuclear program, has been reported by the intelligence group Stratfor to have been a Mossad assassination. Iran is currently conducting atomic research that Israel fears is aimed at building a nuclear weapon. Israel has pressed for United Nations economic sanctions against Iran, and has repeatedly threatened to launch a military strike on Iran if the United States does not do so first.
The 2010 Stuxnet malware targeting Iran’s nuclear program is widely believed to have been sponsored by Israel. In 2009, a year before Stuxnet was discovered, researcher Scott Borg suggested that Israel might prefer to mount a cyber-attack rather than a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran uses IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz, which are based on the P-1 centrifuge, the design A. Q. Khan stole in 1976 and took to Pakistan. His black market nuclear-proliferation network sold P-1s to, among other customers, Iran and Libya. Experts believe that Israel also somehow acquired P-1s and tested Stuxnet on the centrifuges, installed at the Dimona facility that is part of its own nuclear program. The equipment may be from the United States, which received P-1s from Libya’s former nuclear program.”
-In 2007 Israel sought an exemption to non-proliferation rules in order to import atomic material legally.
– NPT issues: ”
In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. Arab nations and annual conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) repeatedly have called for application of IAEA safeguards and the creation of a nuclear-free Middle East. Arab nations have accused the United States of practicing a double standard in criticizing Iran’s nuclear program while ignoring Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. According to a statement by the Arab League, Arab states will withdraw from the NPT if Israel acknowledges having nuclear weapons but refuses to open its facilities to international inspection and destroy its arsenal.
In a statement to the May 2009 preparatory meeting for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the US delegation reiterated the longstanding US support for “universal adherence to the NPT”, but uncharacteristically named Israel among the four countries that have not done so. An unnamed Israeli official dismissed the suggestion that it would join the NPT and questioned the effectiveness of the treaty. The Washington Times reported that this statement threatened to derail the 40-year-old secret agreement between the U.S. and Israel to shield Israel’s nuclear weapons program from international scrutiny, while Avner Cohen, author of Israel and the Bomb, argued that acknowledging its nuclear program would allow Israel to take part constructively in efforts to control nuclear weapons.
The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference calls for a conference in 2012 to implement a resolution of the 1995 NPT Review Conference that calls for the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The United States joined the international consensus for Final Document, but criticized the section on the Middle East resolution for singling out Israel as the only state in the region that is not party to the NPT, while at the same time ignoring Iran’s non-compliance with its NPT obligations.”
–India possesses nuclear weapons and maintains short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable aircraft, surface ships, and submarines under development as possible delivery systems and platforms. Although it lacks an operational ballistic missile submarine, India has ambitions of possessing a nuclear triad in the near future when Arihant the lead ship of India’s Arihant class of nuclear-powered submarines formally joins the Indian Navy in 2012 after undergoing extensive sea-trials.
– India is not a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which India argues entrenches the status quo of the existing nuclear weapons states whilst preventing general nuclear disarmament. India tested a nuclear device in 1974 (code-named “Smiling Buddha“), which it called a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” The test used plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, and raised concerns that nuclear technology supplied for peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons purposes
India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on “credible minimum deterrence.” In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine[dead link] which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of “retaliation only”. The document also maintains that India “will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail” and that decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the Prime Minister or his ‘designated successor(s).'”
According to the NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001-2002, India remains committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy.
Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon signaled a significant shift from “No first use” to “no first use against non-nuclear weapon states” in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of National Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a doctrine Menon said reflected India’s “strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence.”
– program started in 1944
-As early as 26 June 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India’s first Prime Minister, announced: “As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal”
– in 1998 us and japan imposed sanctions bc of noncompliance with the npt, but they have been lifted
-“India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CTBT), which was adopted on 10 September 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament “within a time-bound framework.” India also demanded that the treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India’s ratification for the treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister I.K.Gujral reiterated India’s opposition to the treaty, saying that “India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons, but considers that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive and bans only certain types of tests.”
In August 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved safeguards agreement with India under which the former will gradually gain access to India’s civilian nuclear reactors. In September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India a waiver allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. The implementation of this waiver makes India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the NPT but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.
Since the implementation of NSG waiver, India has signed nuclear deals with several countries including France, United States, Mongolia, Namibia, and Kazakhstan while the framework for similar deals with Canada and United Kingdom are also being prepared”
-In early March 2006, India and the United States finalized an agreement, in the face of criticism in both countries, to provide India with US civilian nuclear technology. Under the deal India has committed to classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power plants as being for civilian use and to place them under IAEA safeguards. Mohamed ElBaradei, then Director General of the IAEA, welcomed the deal by calling India “an important partner in the non-proliferation regime
Pakistan: (also north korea but dont want to get into that)
-began in 1972 after India started developing (in response to them)
– 1998 became the 7th country to successfully develop and test nuclear weapons
-After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Foreign minister (later Prime minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aggressively began the advocating the option of “nuclear weapons programmes” but such attempts were dismissed by Finance minister Muhammad Shoaib and chairman I.H. Usmani. Pakistani scientists and engineers’ working at IAEA became aware of advancing Indian nuclear program towards making the bombs. Therefore, On October 1965, Munir Ahmad Khan, director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met with Bhutto on emergency basis in Vienna, revealing the facts about the Indian nuclear programme and a weapon production facility in Trombay. At this meeting Munir Khan concluded: “a (nuclear) India would further undermine and threaten Pakistan’s security, and for her survival, Pakistan needed a nuclear deterrent…”
– Although Pakistan began the development of nuclear weapons in 1972, Pakistan responded to India’s 1974 nuclear test (see Smiling Buddha) with a number of proposals toprevent a nuclear competition in South Asia. On many different occasions, India rejected the offer
– history on why they wanted a nuclear program: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to Pakistan losing roughly 56,000 square miles (150,000 km2) of territory as well as losing millions of its citizens to the newly created state of Bangladesh. It was a psychological setback for Pakistanis; Pakistan had lost its geo-political, strategic, and economic influence in South-Asia. Furthermore, Pakistan had failed to gather any moral support from its key allies, the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The 1971 war with India was a crushing defeat for Pakistan, and China failed to provide any significant assistance to Pakistan. Isolated internationally, Pakistan seemed to be in great mortal danger, and quite obviously could rely on no one but itself. At United Nations Security Council meeting, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto drew comparisons with the Treaty of Versailles which Germany was forced to sign in 1919. There, Bhutto vowed never to allow a repeat. Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was “obsessed” with India’s nuclear program, that is why Bhutto immediately came up with the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons to prevent Pakistan from signing another ‘Treaty of Versailles‘ as it did in 1971.
– Since early 1980s, Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation activities have not been without controversy. However, since the arrest of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Government has taken concrete steps to ensure that Nuclear proliferation is not repeated and have assured the IAEA about the transparency of Pakistan’s upcoming Chashma Nuclear Power Complex series of Nuclear Power Plants. In November 2006, The International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors approved an agreement with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to apply safeguards to new nuclear power plants to be built in the country with Chinese assistance
– not known to have biological or chemical weapons either
– In an opinion published in The Hindu, former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran wrote that Pakistan’s expanding nuclear capability is “no longer driven solely by its oft-cited fears of India” but by the “paranoia about U.S. attacks on its strategic assets. Noting recent changes in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, Saran said “the Pakistan military and civilian elite is convinced that the United States has also become a dangerous adversary, which seeks to disable, disarm or take forcible possession of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals and its status as nuclear power— Pakistan has also increased its plutonium development (needed for bombs) recently
– Pakistan has proposed six non-proliferation bilateral/regional treaties to India which have all been rejected
– In 1989, they agreed not to attack each others’ nuclear facilities
– June 2004- signed an agreement to set up and maintain a hotline to warn each other of any accident that could be mistaken for a nuclear attack
– March 2005 –signed an agreement where both nations would alert the other on ballistic missile tests
-Pakistan laid out its nuclear disarmament policy and what it sees as the proper goals and requirements for meaningful negotiations:
- A commitment by all states to complete verifiable nuclear disarmament;
- Eliminate the discrimination in the current non-proliferation regime;
- Normalize the relationship of the three ex-NPT nuclear weapon states with those who are NPT signatories;
- Address new issues like access to weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors;
- Non-discriminatory rules ensuring every state’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- Universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states;
- A need to address the issue of missiles, including development and deployment of Anti-ballistic missile systems;
- Strengthen existing international instruments to prevent the militarization of outer space, including development of ASATs;
- Tackle the growth in armed forces and the accumulation and sophistication of conventional tactical weapons.
- Revitalise the UN disarmament machinery to address international security, disarmament and proliferation challenges.
Pakistan has repeatedly stressed at international forums like the Conference on Disarmament that it will give up its nuclear weapons only when other nuclear armed states do so, and when disarmament is universal and verifiable. It rejects any unilateral disarmament on its part
– US alleges that China has played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan’s atomic bomb development infrastructure
– According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and has provided critical technical assistance in the construction of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China is a signatory, China maintained in 2001 that they had not
– In 1986, it was reported that both countries have signed a mutual treaty of peaceful use of civil nuclear technology agreement in which China would supply Pakistan a civil-purpose nuclear power plan
– The french tried to help them build a civilian plant in 1990, but the US complained so the deal didn’t go through
– Pakistan refuses to adopt a “no-first-use” doctrine, indicating that it would strike India with atomic weapons even if India did not use such weapons first. Pakistan’s asymmetric nuclear posture has significant influence on India’s decision ability to retaliate, as shown in 2001 and 2008 crises, when Pakistan-based terror organization carried out deadly attacks on Indian soil, only to be met with a relatively subdued response from India. A former Indian Chief of Army Staff, General Shankar Roychowdhury, stated that “Pakistan’s threat of nuclear first-use deterred India from seriously considering conventional military strikes.” India is Pakistan’s primary geographic neighbor and primary strategic competitor, helping drive Pakistan’s conventional warfare capability and nuclear weapons development: The two countries share an 1800 mile border and have suffered a violent history—four wars in less than seven decades. The past three decades have seen India’s economy eclipse that of Pakistan’s, allowing the former to outpace the latter in defense expenditure at a decreasing share of GDP. In comparison to population, India is more powerful than Pakistan by almost every metric of military, economic, and political power—and the gap continues to grow
– The relative weakness in defense warfare is highlighted in Pakistan’s nuclear posture, which Pakistan considers its primary deterrent from Indian conventional offensives or nuclear attack–With its relatively smaller conventional force, and lacking adequate technical means, especially in early warning and surveillance, Pakistan relies on a more proactive nuclear defense policy.
– Indian political scientist Vipin Narang, however, argues that Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture, or the rapid first use of nuclear weapons against conventional attacks to deter their outbreak, increases instability in South Asia
– Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Pakistan has responded to the report by stating that the United States itself has not ratified the CTBT. Consequently, not all of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards
-The government institutional organization authorized to make critical decisions about Pakistan’s nuclear posturing is the NCA. The NCA has its genesis since 1970sand has been constitutionally established in February 2000. The NCA is composed of two civic-military committees that advises and console both Prime minister and thePresident of Pakistan, on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex
– From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid Pakistan in guarding its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories
– Since 2004 the United States government has reportedly been concerned about the safety of Pakistani nuclear facilities and weapons. Press reports have suggested that the United States has contingency plans to send in special forces to help “secure the Pakistani nuclear arsenal”–it’s incredibly important for the US that the weapons don’t fall into terrorist hands, but Pakistan insists they are safe
-A report published by The Times in early 2010 states that the U.S. is training an elite unit to recover Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials should they be seized by militants, possibly from within the Pakistani nuclear security organization. This was done in the context of growing Anti-Americanism in the Pakistani Armed Forces, multiple attacks on sensitive installations over the previous 2 years and rising tensions. According to former U.S. intelligence official Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, U.S. concerns are justified because militants have struck at several Pakistani military facilities and bases since 2007. According to this report, the United States does not know the locations of all Pakistani nuclear sites and has been denied access to most of them– but in 2010 US denied that trying to take over Pakistan weapons
– A study by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University titled ‘Securing the Bomb 2010’, found that Pakistan’s stockpile “faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth
– According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US department of energy there is “a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding
– In April 2011, IAEA’s deputy director general Denis Flory declared Pakistan’s nuclear programme safe and secure. According to the IAEA, Pakistan is currently contributing more than $1.16 million in IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, making Pakistan as 10th largest contributor–HOW MUCH DOES POLITICS MATTER IN THIS??
– In response to a November 2011 article in The Atlantic written by Jeffrey Goldberg highlighting concerns about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the Pakistani Government announced that it would train an additional 8,000 people to protect the country’s nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the Pakistani Government also denounced the article. Training will be completed no later than 2013. But on the other hand, Pakistan consistently maintains that it has tightened the security over the several years
– Insist that the world must recognize them as a Nuclear Power and that their weapons are safe
– The NSG Guidelines currently rule out nuclear exports by all major suppliers to Pakistan and Israel, with very narrow exceptions, since neither has full-scope IAEA safeguards
In the first half of 2010, it was strongly believed that China had signed a civilian nuclear deal with Pakistan claiming that the deal was “peaceful”.
Arms control advocates criticised the reported China-Pakistan deal as they did in case of U.S.-India deal claiming that both the deals violate the NPT by facilitating nuclear programmes in states which are not parties to the NPT. Some reports asserted that the deal was a strategic move by China to balance US influence in South-Asia